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THE SENSUS FIDELIUM: DISCERNING THE PATH OF FAITH 
 
SUSAN K. WOOD 
 
The ecumenical commitments of Christian churches today contribute an 
interesting complexity to a consideration of the sensus fidelium and its relationship to 
a consensus fidelium. By definition, the division among churches is a division in 
faith, so the question arises, how can this be if we suppose that baptized persons 
endowed with the Spirit participate in the sensus fidei? What are the implications of a 
sensus fidelium among separated Christians for ecumenical work? In this presentation 
I explore the source of the knowledge that is the sensus fidei, the kind of knowledge 
that is the sensus fidei, and will then apply it to the ecumenical movement. 
A consideration of the sensus fidei must with its reference in Lumen gentium 12, 
which attributes to the universal body of the faithful, anointed by the Holy Spirit, a 
supernatural sense of the faith when it expresses the consent (consensum) of all in 
matters of faith and morals. This body “adheres indefectibly to the ‘faith which was 
once for all delivered to the saints” and “penetrates more deeply into that same faith 
through right judgment and applies it more fully to life.” 
 
Faith  
 
The term sensus fidei has two parts.  The first, sensus, refers to the type of 
knowledge we are dealing with and the second, fidei, refers to the object of that 
knowledge, that is, faith. Let me begin with the latter, faith. The text from Lumen 
Gentium 12 refers to faith in the singular as in “supernatural sense of the faith,” and 
“penetrates more deeply into that same faith,” but it also slips into a plurality where it 
speaks of “matters of faith and morals.” We can ask, then, is the sensus fidei about all 
kinds of things that are to be believed, a plurality, or is faith unitary, a whole, a 
“one”?  
Dei Verbum famously identifies Jesus Christ as the fullness of all revelation (DV 
2). Given this identification, one would expect a personalist account of faith to 
correspond with this personalist account of revelation. One of the curiosities of this 
document, however, is the scant attention it gives to faith, the reception of the 
revelation that is Jesus Christ. It only treats it in one paragraph, largely repeating 
what was said about faith at Vatican I: 
In response to God’s revelation our duty is “the obedience of faith” (see 
Rom 16:26; compare Rom 1:5; 2 Cor 10:5–6). By this a human being makes 
a total and free self-commitment to God, offering “the full submission of 
intellect and will to God as he reveals,” and willingly assenting to the 
revelation he gives (DV 5).  
Assent of intellect and will corresponds to the more propositional concept of 
revelation that prevailed at Vatican I. Even though the text places Vatican I’s 
emphasis on the assent of faith by intellect and will in the broader context of total 
self-commitment, it does not develop this personal aspect of faith in any detail, nor 
does it develop the dialogical character of faith. Although Dei Verbum repeats 
Vatican I’s propositional description of revelation as the “eternal decrees of his 
[God’s] will concerning the salvation of human kind” at the end of chapter 1, it 
subordinates this propositional concept of revelation to a personalistic concept of 
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Jesus Christ as the fullness of revelation. This personalistic presentation, however, 
failed to carry through to a correspondingly robust personalistic account of faith.  
A more personalisitic account of faith appears in the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church within a context of invitation and response correlated to the relationship 
between revelation and faith. God addresses his people as friends and the adequate 
response is faith (§ 142). Faith is not only the submission of intellect and will to God, 
but an assent given with one’s whole being, this response identified with the 
“obedience of faith” (§ 143). The Catechism interprets “obedience of faith” as the 
human response to God when a person gives her assent to God with her “whole 
being,” including intellect and will.1 The text then draws on a personal typology of 
faith, presenting Abraham and Mary as models of faith. The specific advances over 
Dei Verbum are 1) the dialogical dynamic of faith within the exchange of invitation 
and response, and 2) the personal typology. 
The document from the International Theological Commission,  “Sensus Fidei in 
the Life of the Church” (2014), further develops this dialogical and personal account 
of faith, speaking of it as a response to the Word of God, identified with the Gospel 
(§ 8). As the text notes, “The Gospel as a strong subject; Jesus himself, the word of 
God” (§ 9). Like the Catechism, the document appeals to the faith of Abram, “who 
trusted completely in God’s promises (Gen 15:6; cf. Rom 4:11,17)” as the meaning of 
faith in the New Testament (§ 9).  However, in the language of the evangelist Mark, it 
describes the whole person responding in faith “with your heart, and with all your 
soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength” (Mk 12:31). Faith is “both 
an act of belief or trust and also that which is believed or confessed, fides qua and 
fides quae.” (§ 10). Finally, the document of the International Theological 
Commission integrates the personal dimension of faith into the ecclesial dimension (§ 
11).    
Since the primary object of what is believed is the person of Christ, this  suggests 
that the dynamic within which a sensus fidei occurs must be one of dialogical 
encounter. The sensus fidei begins with an encounter with the transformative love of 
Christ. Pope Francis, in his Apostolic Exhortation, The Joy of the Gospel, echoes Dei 
Verbum’s  personalist understanding of divine disclosure and the theme of dialogical 
encounter in his invitation to all Christians to a renewed personal encounter with 
Jesus Christ (§ 3).2 He advocates a loving contemplation of the Scriptures in which 
we read with the heart (§ 264). He urges a personal transparency to Christ, a posture 
of an open heart and a reception of Jesus’ gaze of love as when he told Nathaniel “I 
saw you under the fig tree” (§ 262). This encounter is also an experience of God’s 
mercy, and the fruit of this encounter is joy, the “joy of the Gospel.”  
To summarize the characteristics of the kind of faith involved in the sensus fidei, 
we can say that it is a fiduciary faith, understood as a confident and trusting faith in 
God’s promise, in which one commits oneself to the object of faith. It begins with 
this experience of encounter and return to the heart of the gospel message, namely the 
risen Christ. This encounter with Christ occurs in daily prayer, in the renewed study                                                              
1 The phrase, “obedience of faith,” always associated with the sensus fidei, originates in 
Romans 1:5 and 16:26. See also Acts 6:7, where it is “obedience to the faith.”  
2 Francis, Apostolic Exhortation, Evangelii Gaudium (The Joy of the Gospel), 24 
November 2013. 
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of the Scriptures in the liturgical life of the church, and in service to the poor. This 
encounter with Christ is the source of both a universal and unitary faith, that which 
all the faithful share in common, as well as the particular, multiple, and individual 
vocations to moral actions, states of life, and missionary impulses experienced by the 
faithful. The knowledge obtained through this experience is intellectual, involves a 
connaturality to grace, and involves the whole person including the will as appetitive.  
 
Sensus 
 
Now I turn to the other term in sensus fidei, namely sensus, and consider the kind 
of knowledge represented by the sensus fidei. In what follows I will define 
connaturality according to Thomas Aquinas and Jacques Maritain, then relate that to 
Ignatian discernment and Rahner’s work on a formal existential ethic and knowledge 
of particulars. All of this will set up an interpretation of the religious experiences of 
Martin Luther and John Wesley that gave rise to interpretations of justification by 
faith that set churches issuing from the Reformation at odds with the Roman Catholic 
Church. I suggest that understanding these experiences interpreted as instances of the 
sensus fidei through Otto Pesch’s categories of sapiential and existential theology 
gives us an insight as to how to proceed ecumenically in evaluating the difference in 
the two approaches to justification. 
 
Connatural knowledge in Thomas Aquinas 
 
Thomas Aquinas refers to connatural knowledge in his discussion on moral 
judgment. He distinguishes two different ways to make a moral judgment. In the first, 
we possess a conceptual and rational knowledge of virtues that produces in us an 
intellectual conformity with the truths involved. In the second instance, we possess 
the virtue in question in our own powers of will and desire, have it embodied in 
ourselves, and are thus co-natured with it. In this second instance, when we are asked 
about a moral virtue, we give the right answer by looking at and consulting what we 
are and the inner bents or propensities of our own being. 
In Thomas connaturality is associated with wisdom that is the gift of the Holy 
Spirit to judge right about things on account of connaturality with them. Furthermore, 
“this sympathy or connaturality for divine things is the result of charity which unites 
us to God (1 Cor 6:17).”3 Even though wisdom as an intellectual virtue pronounces 
right judgment about divine things after reason has made its inquiry, the gift of the 
Spirit judges aright on account of connaturality with them.4 Significantly, Thomas 
uses the language the language of charity to describe this relationship.  
Connaturality, then, is possible only on account of the gift of the wisdom given 
on the initiative of God. As distinct from the other gifts, wisdom is knowledge of 
divine things through union, that is, through love. Since this wisdom resides in the 
will, the will moves the intellect to judge rightly. The role of the will here contrasts 
wisdom to the other intellectual gifts in that wisdom is knowledge of divine things 
through taste and affective union. It is knowledge through union rather than through 
reason.                                                                
3 Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 45, a. 2. 
4 Ibid. 
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Connatural knowledge in Jacques Maritain 
 
Jacques Maritain attempts a quasi-definition of connatural knowledge, defining it 
as affective and non-conceptual. In his essay, “On Knowledge Through 
Connaturality,” he says 
In this knowledge through union or inclination, connaturality or 
congeniality, the intellect is at play not alone, but together with affective 
inclinations and the dispositions of the will, and is guided and directed by 
them. It is not rational knowledge, knowledge through the conceptual, 
logical and discursive exercise of reason. But it is really and genuinely 
knowledge, though obscure and perhaps incapable of giving account of 
itself, or of being translated into words.5 
In another essay Maritain observes, “the intellect in order to bear judgment, 
consults and listens to the inner melody that the vibrating strings of abiding 
tendencies made present in the subject.6 
Maritain here emphasizes that connaturality results in real knowledge even 
though it results from a form of non-discursive reason. Furthermore, this knowledge 
remains rather inchoate insofar as it may not be expressed in clear descriptive 
language. Finally, he describes it as a sort of resonance between the knower and the 
known, echoing Thomas’ example of the chaste person forming a right judgment 
about chastity through connaturality through the possession of that virtue.  
 
Rahner’s formal existential ethic and the sensus fidei 
 
St. Ignatius of Loyola incorporates the concept of connaturality into his rules for 
the discernment of spirits. According to Harvey Eagan, Rahner’s teaching on 
consolation, desolation, and Election constitutes the first attempt in the history of 
spirituality to give systematic instructions for finding the individual will of God 
through the discernment of spirits. 7  I suggest that this discernment rests on the 
principles of connatural knowledge and further contributes to the concept of 
connaturality through the experience of consolation without previous cause.  
Karl Rahner utilizes the dynamic of Ignatian discernment, and implicitly 
connatural knowledge, to explain how an individual arrives at knowledge of the 
moral requirements of the Christian life in his article, “On the Question of a Formal 
Existential Ethics.”8 That this method is not restricted to moral knowledge is evident 
from his essay, “The Logic of Concrete Individual Knowledge of Ignatius of 
                                                             
5 Jacques Maritain, “On Knowledge Through Connaturality,” The Review of Metaphysics 
4 (1951): 473–74. 
6 Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 91–
92.  
7 Harvey D. Egan, The Spiritual Exercises and the Ignatian Mystical Horizon (St. Louis: 
The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1978), 132. 
8 Karl Rahner, “On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethic,” Theological 
Investigations, Vol. II (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1963), 217–34. 
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Loyola,”9 which incorporates the same dynamic. Rahner’s formal existential ethic 
seeks to account for specific moral imperatives apart from the application of 
syllogistic deductive reasoning applied to a universal norm. The major problem is an 
epistemological one:  how does the individual perceive the individual moral reality 
and its obligation? In the instance of the sensus fidei, the question is how does the 
individual perceive what is to be grasped in faith?  
Rahner approaches a solution through a combination of his transcendental 
horizon and the teaching on choice in the second mode of election in the Spiritual 
Exercises of St. Ignatius. For Rahner, any particular object of conceptual knowledge 
is known against a “horizon” which is apprehended, but which remains unthematic 
and is not itself grasped as a conceptual object. The pre-apprehension of this horizon 
constitutes the condition of possibility for the human knowing of any particular 
object. He holds that a direct, although unconceptualized, experience of this horizon 
constitutes consolation without previous cause.  
The process of discernment consists in having simultaneously present in 
consciousness a finite object and some part of the experience of consolation without 
cause. This experience of consolation now constitutes the divine criteria of the 
rightness or wrongness of the object for the individual. The aptness of the object of 
election is determined by experiencing over a period of time the coherence or 
disharmony between the object of election and the experience of divine 
transcendence by frequently confronting the object of Election with the fundamental 
consolation, the experimental test is made whether the two phenomena are in 
harmony, mutually cohere, whether the will to the object of Election under scrutiny 
leaves intact the pure openness to God in the supernatural experience of 
transcendence and even supports and augments it or weakens and obscures it. . . And 
the will to this limited finite objection of decision produces peace, tranquility, and 
quiet, so that true gladness and spiritual joy ensue, that is, the joy of pure, free, 
undistorted transcendence; or whether…sharpness, tumult and disturbance arise.10 
The knowledge of individual prescriptions, then, is derived from this 
experimental, non-discursive knowledge in which the affective states of consolation 
and desolation are decisive rather than reason. This knowledge is characterized as 
felt, personal, connatural, intuitive, nonverbal, mystical, and is most often described 
as a “tasting” or a “savoring.” This harmony is experienced as “peace”, “joy”, 
“tranquility”, or “quiet”.  Egan notes that this experience of consolation can be 
explained only through the interior harmony and unity that results when the total 
body-person has become connatural to grace.11  
In spite of its emotional dimension, however, Rahner is careful to note that this 
experience is not reducible to “feeling,” instinct, or something similar contrary to or 
apart from the intellect. However, neither is it a cognition that is rationally discursive 
and conceptually expressible.  It is, rather, “a thoroughly intellectual operation of the 
“intellect,” in the metaphysical, scholastic sense of the word, in which it is capable of 
                                                             
9 Karl Rahner, “The Logic of Concrete Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola,” in The 
Dynamic Element in the Church (New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 84–170.  
10 Karl Rahner, The Dynamic Element in the Church (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1964), 158.  
11 Ibid., 61. 
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apprehending values.”12 Rational reflection is an indispensible element in the motion 
of spirits since the motions themselves contain an objective conceptual element and 
can be expressed and verified since the experience of consolation and desolation is 
the result of impulses having a rational structure.13  
This experience of consolation is identified with the human person’s graced 
transcendence oriented towards God who is always present as the horizon of any 
explicit consciousness. In the experience of consolation, the source itself is perceived 
as something not distinct from the consolation itself.  Rahner concludes,  “if there is a 
non-conceptual mode of knowing, it can only be the non-conceptual awareness of 
transcendence or a heightened prolongation of it.” This experience, then, is a 
“perception” or “sense” of God. 
The term “connatural” is used to mean that from within the very core of the 
human person, at the fine point of the spirit, at the place of deepest freedom and 
mystery, created grace recognizes and knows its source, the Creator. Like recognizes 
like, and that is the experience of unity and harmony. Rahner notes that theologically 
there is no difficulty in supposing that this experience of transcendence is always 
elevated by grace. 14 
Importantly, this is not an esoteric experience reserved for the privileged few.  
This experience of consolation is the fundamental principle in Ignatius’ method of 
supernatural logic by which every person makes decisions. This “mysticism of daily 
life” is present whenever a person comes fully to himself and herself and in full 
possessions of self, surrenders to “the loving Mystery of his life calling him beyond 
himself.” 15  In daily life this occurs when a person makes decisions through a 
fundamental global awareness of self over a period of time and through a feeling of 
the harmony or disharmony of the object of choice, or we might say, object of belief 
with this fundamental feeling about the self.  
Rahner’s analysis takes into account the religious structure of the human person 
at the same time that it explains how there can be a specific will or God for an 
individual, the paradigm of which is a vocation or choice of state in life. Through the 
process just described, an individual comes to an experimental knowledge of himself 
or herself in the congruence of the object of choice with his or her fundamental 
religious orientation. The characteristics of this knowledge, as given here, are that it 
is affective, intellectual, possible because of the human person’s transcendence, 
possible only on account of an individual’s graced nature, and finally, the result of a 
mutual inclination between God and the individual.  
   
Existential theology and the sensus fidei 
 
Any number of examples in spiritual autobiographies attest to a faith-filled 
encounter with Christ with an accompanying experience of consolation often 
resulting in an impulse to particular action. Certainly, Augustine’s account of his 
experience in the garden to “take and read” counts among them. After reading Rom. 
13:14–15, Augustine recounts, “No further would I read; nor needed I: for instantly at                                                              
12 Ibid., 94. 
13 Ibid., 102–103.  
14 Ibid., 144. 
15 Eagan, 56. 
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the end of this sentence, by a light as it were of serenity infused into my heart, all the 
darkness of doubt vanished away.”16 
Such experiences may represent an integrating insight for a person or provide the 
motivation at the root of the foundation of a religious community. Evidence also 
suggests that such experiences may be the origin of theological insights for religious 
movements that at times resulted in the division of churches. However, for our 
purposes here, namely the experiences of those whom Vatican II calls “separated 
Christians,” both give significant clues to the founding impulse of their movement 
and a clue to how to interpret the theology emanating from these foundational 
experiences. 
Martin Luther’s Tower Experience, which occurred when he was studying 
Romans 1:17, was not just a personal religious experience; it became paradigmatic 
for his teaching on justification. Here is the experience as Martin Luther relates it: 
I greatly longed to understand Paul’s epistle to the Romans and nothing 
stood in the way but that one expression “the righteousness of God,” 
because I took it to mean that righteousness whereby God is just and deals 
justly in punishing the unjust. 
My situation was that, although an impeccable monk, I stood before 
God as a sinner troubled in conscience, and I had no confidence that my 
merit would assuage Him. Therefore I did not love a just angry God, but 
rather hated and murmured against Him. Yet I clung to the dear Paul and 
had a great yearning to know what he meant. 
Night and day I pondered until I saw the connection between the 
righteousness of God and the statement that “the just shall live by faith.” 
Then I grasped that the righteousness of God is that righteousness by which 
through grace and sheer mercy God justifies us through faith. Thereupon I 
felt myself to be reborn and to have gone through open doors into paradise. 
The whole of Scripture took on a new meaning, and whereas before “the 
righteousness of God” had filled me with hate, now it became to me 
inexpressibly sweet in greater love. This passage of Paul became to me a 
gate to heaven.17 
Luther’s account of his experience exhibits the characteristics of connatural 
knowledge. It results in intellectual knowledge of justification accompanied by an 
experience of consolation.  
Luther was later able to describe this same insight in a more discursive 
theological style in his Preface to the Letter of St. Paul to the Romans. In the 
following excerpt, the first person discourse of his account of his Tower Experience 
shifts to third person discourse while expressing what is essentially the same 
experience and conviction:  
Faith is a living, unshakeable confidence in God’s grace; it is so certain, 
that someone would die a thousand times for it. This kind of trust in and                                                              
16 Aurelius Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. Edward Pusey, Vol. VII, 
Part 1, The Harvard Classics, (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14); Bartleby.com, 2001. 
www.bartleby.com/7/1/, Book Eight, Chapter 12, Paragraphs 27–28 (accessed on July 10, 
2015).  
17 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works Vol. 54, Theodore Tappert, ed. (Saint Louis; Concordia 
Publishing House, 1968), 193–194. 
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knowledge of God’s grace makes a person joyful, confident, and happy with 
regard to God and all creatures. This is what the Holy Spirit does by faith. 
Through faith, a person will do good to everyone without coercion, willingly 
and happily; he will serve everyone, suffer everything for the love and praise 
of God, who has shown him such grace. It is as impossible to separate works 
from faith as burning and shining from fire… 
Now justice is just such a faith. It is called God’s justice or that justice 
which is valid in God’s sight, because it is God who gives it and reckons it 
as justice for the sake of Christ our Mediator.18 
To take up another example, John Wesley describes his experience of hearing 
this same text from Luther: 
In the evening I went very unwillingly to a society in Aldersgate Street, 
where one was reading Luther’s preface to the Epistle to the Romans. About 
a quarter before nine, while he was describing the change which God works 
in the heart through faith in Christ, I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I 
did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation; and an assurance was given 
me that He had taken away my sins, even mine, and saved me from the law 
of sin and death.19 
 
These texts share in common an encounter with the word of God, that is, the 
Word of God, Jesus, mediated by the word of the Scriptures. Each of these texts 
(either in the excerpt cited or in the complete account of the experience) describes a 
liberation from sin, an unmistakable experience of consolation, and, finally, a new 
insight into the interpretation of the Scriptures, particularly the text from Romans on 
justification. Both Luther and Wesley describe a fundamental insight into justification 
through faith that became the lynchpin of their theology. This insight begins in a 
personal experience of consolation, but its intellectual component renders it capable 
of being expressed theologically in such a way that it could become church doctrine 
for Lutherans and Methodists. The experience occurs within a dynamic of God’s 
promise perceived as addressed personally to an individual and the reception of that 
promise in faith within a dynamic of direct address.  
I propose that the characteristics of this experiential and existential worldview 
correspond to the type of knowledge represented by knowledge obtained through the 
sensus fidei.  I further suggest that the theology developed from such a sensus fidei 
corresponds to what Otto Pesch describes as an existential theology. 20  Broadly 
speaking, existential theology has as its theme the act of faith as well as its theoretical                                                              
18 Martin Luther, Preface to the Letter of St. Paul to the Romans, Preface to the Complete 
Edition of Luther’s Latin Works (1545), Trans. Bro. Andrew Thornton, O.S.B., from the 
“Vorrede zu Band I der Opera Latina der Wittenberger Ausgabe 1545”, in Luthers Werke in 
Auswahl, vol. 4, ed. Otto Clemen 
Clemen, 6th ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967), 421–28), available at 
https://leroyng.wordpress.com/2011/05/26/luthers-tower-experience-martin-luther-discovers-
the-true-meaning-of-righteousness (accessed July 11, 2015).   
19 John Wesley, Journal of John Wesley, 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/wesley/journal.vi.ii.xvi.html (accessed May 13, 2015).  
20Otto Hermann Pesch, “Existential and Sapiential Theology: The Theological 
Confrontation Between Luther and Thomas Aquinas,” in Catholic Scholars Dialogue with 
Luther, ed. Jared Wicks (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), 61–81 and 182–93. 
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implications. It is literally directed to one’s one existential self-accounting before 
God, looks from the human person toward God and then from God back to the human 
person. It speaks prototypically within an I-Thou situation and only consequently and 
derivatively in the third person. It speaks in the mode of confession, and with respect 
to salvation, stresses faith, humility, and repentance. 21  Prayer is the context of 
existential theology such that “every theological statement is in fact a variation on a 
word spoken in prayer and can be easily transformed into prayer by a simple change 
in its grammatical form.”22 Pesch consequently asserts, “prayer becomes the norm in 
judging the legitimacy of theological affirmations.”23  
In contrast to this, sapiential theology, which Pesch attributes to Thomas 
Aquinas, is directed to “wisdom,” in the medieval sense of understanding through 
ultimate causes. Its perspective is one of God looking upon the human person. It 
speaks primarily in the third person and speaks descriptively.24 In contrast, existential 
theology emerges from speaking with God rather than being descriptive speech about 
God. 25  Existential theology is confessional rather than theoretical speech. The 
difference between the two is evident when one compares Thomas’ definition of 
theology (as a science insofar as “it flows from fonts recognized in the light of a 
higher science, namely God’s very own which he shares with the blessed”) with that 
of Luther, for whom “the proper subject of theology is man guilty of sin and 
condemned, and God the justifier and Savior of man the sinner.”26 Pesch’s account of 
existential theology is consistent with the passages cited from Pope Francis, 
Augustine, Luther, and Wesley. 
Even though the definitions of theology of Thomas and Luther clearly reflect an 
important difference between the two approaches to theology, it can be argued that 
Pesch does not take into account other aspects of Thomas’ theology, namely his 
account of wisdom and connatural knowledge. It is precisely this aspect of Thomas’ 
theology that is used in this essay to connect connatural knowledge, discernment of 
spirits, and existential theology. Sapiential theology also involves a “tasting” and a 
“savoring” by the very definition of wisdom and thus contains an experiential 
component identified with existential theology. Consequently, contrasting Thomas 
and Luther within Pesch’s categories of sapiential theology and existential theology is 
only valid from a very limited perspective.  
The existential theology described here gives a new insight into the response to 
revelation called “the obedience of faith” (Rom 1:5; 16:26).27 Within an existential 
theology that emerges from the self-actuation and confession of our existence in faith, 
“the obedience of faith” comprises not simply adherence to particular moral 
prescriptions, intellectual assent to propositions of faith, or acquiescence to a 
particular moral imperative, but the total personal orientation of a person towards 
God in holistic receptivity. Here the etymology of the word “obedience” is helpful,                                                              
21 Pesch, 76.  
22 Ibid., 79. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 WA 40II, 328, 7. LW 12, 311. 
27 See “Sensus Fidei in the Life of the Church,” § 21. 
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for it comes from obedio [ob-audire], to give ear to or to listen. “Obedience” is a 
hearing, a receiving of the word—not only teaching, or the Scriptures, but also Christ 
himself—in faith.  It occurs only within a dialogical relationship.  
When applying this distinction to ecumenical theology several cautions are in 
order. Pesch warns that it would be wrong to transpose his distinction between 
existential and sapiential into either personalistic vs. metaphysical modes of 
theological discourse or anthropocentric vs. theocentric, as one sometime encounters. 
Nor is it a psychologizing of our relationship to God. Nor can existential theology be 
exclusively identified with Lutheran theology over against Catholic theology, 
correspondingly exclusively identified with sapiential theology. Thus, Pieter de Witte 
argues that the two perspectives are asymmetrical, with the Catholic position more 
open to incorporating an experiential perspective along with the sapiential in certain 
contexts of prayer and worship, while the Lutheran perspective fears corruption by a 
sapiential perspective.28  
Perhaps all these cautions and qualification simply point to the fact that there are 
two kinds of legitimate knowledge, namely discursive knowledge and connatural 
knowledge and two perspectives from which to view a person’s relationship to God, 
namely, third person objective viewer and first person dialogical encounter. Both are 
legitimate, although each has its own theological methodology and grammar by 
which they are judged.  
 
Connatural knowledge and the consensus fidelium 
 
Even though the analysis of connaturality and an existential theology that 
corresponds to it proceeds from an analysis of an individual, the individual sensus 
fidei is related to a consensus fidelium insofar as the more authentic a personal 
experience, the more that experience resonates with other individual experiences and 
therefore is characterized as universal. The sensus fidei is mediated through the 
individual, but there is a reciprocal relationship between the individual and the 
communal insofar as the individual encountering the gospel in faith encounters it as 
proclaimed to the people of God, within a community of faith constituted by the 
Spirit, and within a liturgy where the individual is constituted a member of the body 
of Christ. 
 
Ecumenical conclusions 
 
Lest there be any misunderstanding, clearly church divisions are not simply the 
result of an existential theology pitted against a sapiential theology. Any reader of 
Luther knows that the narrative of his broken relations with the Catholic Church of 
his time is not simply the result of a discernment of spirits. Nor is his experience one 
of unmitigated consolation. The interweaving of theological convictions and power 
politics as well as mutual prejudices and misunderstanding and also exaggerated 
                                                             
28 Pieter de Witte, Doctrine, Dynamic and Difference (London, New York: T & T Clark, 
2012), 59.  
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caricature created of theological opponents on all sides exacerbated the contentious 
divisions of the sixteenth century.29  
Nevertheless, I hold that seeing Luther’s existential theology through the lens of 
the sensus fidei suggests some principles for proceeding ecumenically. First, when 
the binding positions of two traditions appear to be in conflict, it is good to examine 
what truth of the gospel and the experience of faith those binding positions protect. 
Second, it is important to discern the type of theological discourse that is under 
consideration.  Existential theology cannot be evaluated according to the grammar of 
sapiential theology and vice versa. For example, Catholics have too frequently 
evaluated the Lutheran teaching of “simul iustus et peccactor” against a metaphysical 
ontology which judges that one cannot occupy two conflicting states of being 
simultaneously, although within the language and experience of prayer no other 
posture is possible for a Christian. One simply does not proclaim her own 
righteousness before God. Third, since the sensus fidei cannot be reduced to cognitive 
or moral knowledge, but involves “the integration of every aspect of the human 
person within a communal journey of hearing and response,” the methodology proper 
to ecumenical engagement is approachability, readiness for dialogue, patience, and a 
hermeneutic of generosity. 30  Fourth, the principle of the hierarchy of truths, 
enunciated in Unitatis Redintegratio 11, is necessary in order to achieve “a fitting 
sense of proportion” in evaluating the confessional commitments of our dialogue 
partner.31 As Pope Francis insists, only when a focus on the foundation of faith is 
maintained can the rich doctrinal teaching, including moral and social teachings be 
rightly understood. It is no accident that the foundational experience of the sensus 
fidei by Augustine, Luther, and John Wesley was one of salvation in Christ by faith, 
considered as “an indispensable criterion that constantly serves to orient all the 
teaching and practices of the our churches to Christ.”32 
Fourth, ecumenism can adopt the principles of Pope Francis for pastoral ministry 
in general. To join together in the missionary effort to proclaim the heart of the 
gospel, the churches are called “to concentrate upon the essentials, on what is most 
beautiful, most grand, most appealing and at the most time most essential.”33  Rather 
than get bogged down in a disjointed multitude of intricate doctrinal details, churches 
can and must unite around a simplified message of the gospel. This does not mean 
setting aside any of the rich heritage of the church’s teaching and tradition, but rather 
relating individual truths to the “harmonious totality of the Christian message.”34   
Within the ongoing ecumenical movement for unity, to which the church is 
irrevocably committed, this sensus fidei will have to be a sense of a shared faith.35                                                              
29 Lutheran-Roman Catholic Commission on Unity, From Conflict to Communion:  
Lutheran-Catholic Common Commemoration of the Reformation in 2017 (Paderborn: 
Bonifatius, 2013), §§ 231–33. 
30 These characteristics echo those advocated by Pope Francis for catechesis, Christian 
initiation, and Christian formation in general. See Evangelii Gaudium, § 165.  
31 See,Evangelii Gaudium, §§ 33–39, 246.   
32 The Lutheran World Federation and the Roman Catholic Church, Joint Declaration on 
the Doctrine of Justification, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), § 18. 
33 Evangelii Gaudium, § 35. 
34 Ibid., § 29. 
35 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Ut Unum Sint (May 25, 1995), §3.  
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This is not only ecclesial in the sense of residing within a particular confessional 
community, but is also a shared faith that transcends confessional boundaries.  
Finally, the sensus fidelium is performative, that is, faith in action. Rahner’s 
formal existential ethic represented a sensus fidei oriented to moral action or to the 
choice of a state in life that committed an individual to a way of living in society and 
the church. The sensus fidei more generally represents faith that leads to Christian 
discipleship, a commitment to love of God and neighbor inseparable from acts of 
justice and love.  
 
 
  
